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The ancient city of Haliartoe lay on a snail rise, nestled 
between the heights of mount He1ikon to the south and west, and 
the swampy expanse of the copaic basin to the north and east, the 
battle of Haliartos, fought in 395 B.C., is nestled between the 
stable age of Athenian empire and a period of political chaos in 
Greeds ended by the domination of the Philip IX and the 
Macedonians. Just like the city itself, the battle fought there 
in 395 B.c. sits at a crucial spot. The engagement opened the 
Corinthian War, and ended Lysander's hopes of regaining his 
former glory in Sparta. It also signals the end of Spartan 
ascendancy and foreshadows the spectacular rise of Epaminondan 
and the Thebans.
Historians are blessed with a multiplicity of historical 
sources for this period. Plutarch, Xenophon, Pausanias, Diodorus 
and the Hellenics Oxyrhynchia historian all give accounts of the 
early fourth century. Archaeology has also made important 
contributions. Beginning with excavations in the 1920's under the 
British School at Athens and continuing through today's extensive 
surveys cf Central Greece, the archaeological data helps to 
clarify many points of geography which are muddied by 
conflicting written sources.
Predictably, the written sources often contradict one 
another about specific questions dealing with the battle, its 
causes, and its effects. By comparing the ancient sources with
modern analyses and nodarn archaeological data, an mosaic of tha 
events of tha summer of 39S B.C. emerges. nils picture 
highlights savaral important issues in Classical Greek history.
First and most importantly, tha battle must be understood in 
tha context of Spartan internal politics. Specifically, the 
relationships and personalities of the three spartan leaders; 
Agesiiaus, Lysander and Pausanias must be considered. For this 
purpose, the Lives of Plutarch are our best source. Second, the 
battle holds significance as a point in the evolution of Greek 
warfare from hoplite phalanxes to more flexible armies. It also 
forces a reevaluation of the strategic position of strongholds 
like Haliartoe. in the light of new tactics and troops. Third, and 
for my purposes crucial, the battle and its site may serve as an 
example of problems which can be resolved by the union of 
historical research with anthropological archaeology.
At the beginning of the fourth century B.C., the political 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was unstable in the 
extreme. Athens' defeat in 404 B.C. in the Peloponnesian War 
left a power vacuum on the Greek mainland. Sparta was the logical 
candidate to fill this space, but spartan rule was unsure and by 
395, many problems remained. The principal Greek powers - Argos, 
Corinth and Thebes - were restless in the new political climate. 
In the background was the military power of the mighty Persian 
King, always a factor in questions of Greek politics.
On the one side were the allies of the Corinthian War.
m{;: a«
after the battle of Hallartos, when thay ware joined by the 
Corinthians ami the Argives. But the first of the allies to take 
the offensive against the Spartans was Thebes.
In 395, Thebes led a confederacy of Boiotian city states 
described by the Hellenics Oxyrhynchia. The region was divided 
into eleven districts, each of which furnished one Boiotarch for 
an oligarchical council, and 60 members of a council of 660.* 23 
Haliartos, for example, shared one of these divisions with 
Lebadsia and Coroneia. Orchomenus and Hyettus, perhaps the 
greatest internal threat to Theban ascendancy, controlled two 
divisions between them. Thebes, controlled four divisions in the 
system, with its control over Plataea.2 In short, while Thebes 
was clearly the greatest among equals, it was not a majority of 
one. This system represents perhaps the earliest such 
representative alliance of city states, and is an early carrier 
of the tradition of representative democracy.3
Even if the foreign policy decisions of the Boiotian 
confederacy were resolved by the mandate of the council of 660, 
the fact that the council met at Thebes assured that the Thebans 
influenced its decisions: "The influence of the Thebans in the 
federal council may well have been great, for 240 of the 660
3 Bruce, 1967, pp. 104-105. see also the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia 11,3.
2 Larsen, 1955,p. 34.
3 Larsen, 1955, p. 34.
councilors were supplied by that city, and their prssebcb in the 
Cadme* would always ba assured."4 to a great extent, political
power rested in the hands of leaders within the city of Thebes. 
These leaders were divided into a pro-Spartan party (beontiadas, 
Asias and Coeratadas) and an anti-Spartan party (Ismenias, 
Antitheus and Androcleidas)•5 Persian silver, brought by
Timocrates to the cities of Greece, is held to be an important 
cause of the Corinthian War. In such a case, Ismenias, Antitheus 
and Androcleidas stood to gain financially from war on Sparta. 
More likely, the Persian financial support was a help to the 
anti-Spartan forces, but not their primary motivation. After 
all, they could have taken Persian bribes and done nothing. The 
Persians would have found it difficult to punish their betrayers 
in such a case.
The important causes for the Thebans are twofold. Having 
only recently thrown off the Athenian yoke, the Thebans and their 
allies were not anxious to see that empire replaced by a spartan 
hegemony: "The overthrow of Athens had not led to a general 
liberation but to the replacement of one tyrant power by 
another....By the end of 395 Boeotia and Corinth were prepared to 
carry on war in alliance with Athena and Argos against her 
[Sparta]."6 Thebes was concerned about the Spartan treatment of 
Greek states after her Vxctory. The threat of further Spartan
4 Bruce, 1967, p. 160.
5 Sealey, 1976, p.388.
6 Msiggs, 1972, p. 401.
victories was another causa far concern. If the Spartans wars 
successful in Asia, thair empire could become as big or bigger 
than the Athenian*7 The alliance of the Boiotians with Athens, a 
city whose destruction Thebes had called for nine years earlier, 
shows how unpredictable Greek politics had become*
Hot all the members of the Boiotian confederacy did not have 
the same vision that the Thebans did, however. The northern city 
of Orchomenus, which represented the old Minyan cultural 
tradition, did not rest easy within the alliance. Only recently 
had the Orchomenians been incorporated into the system, and 
centuries before had engaged Thebes in a battle for supremacy 
within Boiotia. Connected to Thebes only by a narrow road, 
Orchomenus and other northwestern members of the Confederation 
had strong parties favoring the Spartans against the Thebans.8 
Haliartos itself appears to have been a fairly loyal member of 
the federation. The city did have a good deal of franchise under 
the system, perhaps in excess of its population and military 
potential. In short, Haliartos did not have any real grievances 
against the Spartans.
The Athenians, on the other hand, had many causes to hate 
the Spartans. Culturally, the two cities stood at opposite ends 
of the Greek spectrum. Athens, the seat of artistic expression 
and individuality, was in stark contrast to the militaristic, 
corporate life of the Spartans: ,fTwo great states now led the
tm
7 delete me
8 Bruce, 1967, p. 106.
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Creaks, They differed in character, in ideology, aiiC in tie 
nature of their power.... Modern historians have argued about the 
caunes of the [Peloponnesian] war, but few have doubted its 
inevitability.**9 Hie Athenian way of life produced generations of 
literati and politicians. The Spartan way of life produced 
generations of supremely disciplined fighters who submerged their 
identity to produce the finest army in Greece. The cultural 
difference between the cities is important to understanding their 
conflicts.
After its defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Athena lay 
prostrate, the Long Walls having been destroyed and her fleet 
decimated. For the Athenians to wage war again after (Wily nine 
years shows the depth of their animosity for the Spartans. Their 
war spirit also shows their faith in their new Thebanallies. As 
we shall see, this faith in the alliance was shared by 
Thebans. Athenian participation in the Corinthian Met 
beginning represented a substantial risk.
The Argives should be regarded as a regionalpowsr 
needed convincing before it would join the alliance. Argos stood 
to gain if they could absorb Corinth into some sort of alliance. 
On the other hand, they risked Spartan reprisal if the alliance 
should fail. As such, they would have to be impressed by an early 
and decisive victory over the Spartans in order to join the 
alliance, an event which seemed unlikely.
The Corinthians were the last and perhaps nest-fikftsfensable
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iBISSI9 Kagan, 1969, pp.2-3.
piece of the puzzle, with Corinth as an ally, the Thebans and 
Athenians could keep the Spartans bottled up inside the 
Peloponnese, preserving their territory from the ravages of war. 
Of course Corinth, controlling the isthmus, would be at the 
flashpoint of conflict if they joined the alliance. If they 
remained faithful to the Peloponnesian league, the forces of the 
League would be loosed on Boiotia and Attica. In the opening 
phase of the war, Corinth held back and declined to send troops 
with Pausanias. The Corinthians needed to be impressed by an 
early and decisive victory to join the alliance. They had the 
most to lose in the war which was to come.
Taken together, the motives of the allies are summed up 
neatly by Hamilton:
The one motive all held in common, however, was 
resentment, fear and hatred of Spartan arrogance and 
aggressiveness. Thus if any single group is to be held 
most responsible for the Corinthian War, it must be the 
Spartan imperialists.... Their constant pursuit of a 
policy of expansion, aggression and imperialism 
exacerbated feeling against Sparta throughout Greece 
and contributed to the complete revolution in Greek 
diplomacy that the anti-Spartan coalition formed in 398 
represented.10
Only be a hatred as strong as this could unite these states 
into a single group. As fear of Athens had joined them before, 
so fear of Sparta joined them again.
Sparta was the most fearsome state in Greece, and with good 
reason. The Spartan phalanx was legendary on the battlefields of 
Greece, and the sight or rumor of it was often enough to carry
Hamilton, 1979, p. 208.
the day. Coming off a surprising naval victory at Agesopotami, 
which finally solved the stalemate of the Peloponnesian War, 
Sparta was the heir apparent to the Athenian empire. War had 
exhausted Sparta, sapping her of much of her military strength. 
Without a strong core of Spartan citizens, the armies of the 
Peloponnesian League were considerably weaker.
Sparta changed uneasily from a military state to the seat of 
empire. Under the leadership of Lysander, himself a member of the 
lower class of Spartan nobility, politics changed as the lower 
classes began to gain importance.11 In any case, the vast amount 
of revenue generated by the wars was a new influence unfamiliar 
to the Spartans. The influx of wealth into Spartan culture and 
politics changed Spartan values and outlook.
The spartan leaders - Agesilaus, Lysander and Pausanias - 
are the subjects of detailed examination in the Lives of 
Plutarch, which contain biographies of both Lysander and 
Agesilaus, In addition, other historical sources give us several 
other clues.
Lysander was the great hero of the Peloponnesian War. The 
first Spartan to be worshiped as a god, he was a proud and 
defiant man. His spectacular rise from humble beginnings may 
explain some of his self confidence (which bordered on arrogance) 
and his tenacity. It may also explain a number of enemies which 
he made in his rise to the top. Lysander was a visionary leader 
who saw Sparta as the new force in world politics. By
11 Plutarch's Lysander. 24-25
implication, this meant a leading role for himself in the new
order. However, judging by the accounts of Plutarch,12 he does
not seem to have been concerned with wealth. Rather, his efforts
were designed to take Sparta to the top of the kn'-vn world. In a
way, he may be seen as an early version of Alexander, in that he
dreamed of Greek empire in Asia.
However, Lysander could not be the king of Sparta because cf
his ancestry. When King Agis died, Lysander supported Agesilaus
as the rightful claimant. Agesilaus had a physical handicap,
which, in light of an oracle and Spartan tradition, was held to
make him an ill-omened king. Lysander pointed out that the other
claimant was an illegitimate son, and that the prophecy could be
referring to this fact.13 In short, Agesilaus owed his position
as the King of Sparta to the political influence of Lysander,
which at that point was at its apex.
Agesilaus was a more moderate man, perhaps more clever and
more capable of compromise. In short, Agesilaus was the more
skilled politician. This aspect of his character is revealed in
several discourses Agesilaus had with Persians in Asiat
Agesilaus certainly does emerge as a highly persuasive 
and ironic man, skilled in the use of bluff and 
deception and these are qualities that are no doubt 
desirable in a politician. Significantly, it is this 
sort of talent, rather than moral qualities, that the 
dialogue form is particularly capable of rendering.14
12 Plutarch*s Lvsander. 30.5
13 Plutarch's Lysander, 22.3-6 and Msailaus, 3.3-5.
While Lysander was fond of such laconic one-liners as: "Thy
words, stranger, lack a city,"15 Agesilaus was capable of winning
over his enemies by charming them:
But Agesilaus was simpler in this also, that he had 
been educated to obey before he came to command. For 
this reason he was much more in harmony with his 
subjects than any of the kings: to the commanding and 
kingly traits which were his by nature there had been 
added by his public training those of popularity and 
kindness.16
Lysander was a merciless soldier, while Agesilaus was a capable 
king.
These differences between the two men should not overshadow 
other, equally important, similarities. Both men had an undying 
hatred of the Thebans. Both men were fond of the simple Way of 
life which traditionally characterized old Sparta. Also, 
according to Plutarch, the two men were homosexual lovers, 
apparently before Agesilaus accession to the throne.
Homosexuality was common enough in ancient Greece; what is 
remarkable here is that the public relationship between these two 
political leaders was accompanied by a private element of 
intimacy.
Pausanias is the least well known of the Spartan 
triumvirate. His rivalry with Lysander is seen in his actions in 
Athens when he interfered there, ostensibly on behalf of the 
thirty Spartan governors of Athens. However, his mission in 
Athens appears to have been intended to foil Lysandsr's plan to
15 Plutarch's toaanflgr, 21.4.
16 Plutarch's ftggallaug» 1.3.
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invade and crush Athens again, thereby adding to Lysander*s own
prestige. Sealey speaks to this incident:
Little is known about the fortunes of the decarchies; 
the case most fully attended to is the rule of the 
Thirty in Athens, which was overthrown by Pausanias in 
403, and it seems likely that many or all of the 
decarchies collapsed in that year, as Pausanias 
challenged the influence of Lysander.1'
The state of relations between the leaders is best summed up by
Parke: MActually in Pausanias1 case even more than that of
Leontychidas or Pleistoanax, there seems to have been intense
bitterness on both sides.1,18 Pausanias* attitude towards
Lysander and the Corinthian War are revealed by his actions at
Haliartos.
The rivalries between these three men, as outlined in 
Plutarch*s descriptions of them, are essential to understanding 
the course of events at Haliartos. Lysander was pressured by a 
desire to regain the political power and prestige denied him by 
the kingship of Agesilaus, and Pausanias* actions at Haliartos 
were dictated by his conflict with Lysander.
The third party in this crowded political picture are the 
Persians. As the fourth century opened, they were the principal 
enemy of the Spartans. Agesilaus* first action as the king of 
Sparta was to collect a force of Greeks to invade Asia, much as 
Agamemmnon had done centuries before. In order to closely 
imitate the beginning of the Trojan War, Agesilaus also wanted *18
Sealey, 1976, p.386.
18 Parke, 1945, p. 110.
to sacrifice at Aulis. Agesilaus did not pay the priests at 
Aulis, which angered the Boiotians. In reprisal, they ran 
Agesilaus off and threw his sacrifice off of the altar.
Obviously, these actions did not endear the Thebans to 
Agesilaus, but they do show the seriousness with which Agesilaus 
approached his expedition to Asia.
The Persian Empire, Agesilaus1 formidable opponent, was a 
huge collection of lesser kings and satraps ruled over by the 
Great King. The Greeks in Asia Minor did not represent any great 
worry for the empire as a whole, but it was a problem for the 
satraps involved. The purpose here is not to detail Persian 
imperial politics, but suffice it to say that the Persian satrap 
Pharnabasus encouraged rebellion against the Spartans by sending 
a Rhodian envoy, Timocrates, who distributed talents of silver to 
the anti-Spartan parties in Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth. 
While this was not the primary cause for resistance against 
Sparta, it did represent an important encouragement for the anti- 
Spartan parties on mainland Greece.
In short, the Persians seemed to have the most to gain *Vom 
an alliance of mainland Greek regional powers against Sparta.
Such a war would get Agesilaus out of Asia Minor, and keep a 
state of political chaos alive in Greece. As we shall see, the 
Persians received a substantial return from their investment in 
Timocrates. 19
19 Plutarch's Aaasilaus. 6.4-6
At this point, it may be valuable to attempt a 
reconstruction of the motives of the involved powers in order to 
better understand the actions which sent them to war. The 
campaign in Asia quickly led to a power struggle as Agesilaus 
dealt with the political situation left by Lysander: MIt was in 
this context that a most surprising event occurred: Agesilaus 
shook himself free from Lysander' s domination and took energetic 
measures to curtail his influence.1,20 Their rivalry was born on 
the Asian expedition as more and more, Lysander was treated by 
subordinates as the leader of the army, whereas Agesilaus, though 
king, was denied the respect equal to his status. Giving out 
various titles to his close lieutenants, he gave the title of 
■"carver of meats'* to Lysander.20 1 Needless to say, Lysander took 
this as a slap in the face. Sent away from the center of the 
action, he became arrogant and unmerciful and for this reason was 
summoned home by the ephors.22 To be home from the front when a 
Spartan army was in the field must have been a difficult and 
bitter pill for Lysander to swallow.
The activities of the Spartan armies in Asia had one further 
effect on the situation which has been previously noted. The 
pressure was on Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap, to get the 
Spartan armies out of his territory:
...the most far-reaching effect of his activity was the
20 Hamilton, 1979, p. 185.
21 Plutarch's Lysander, 23.1-9.
22 Plutarch's Lyaflnd.ec, 24.1-2.
reaction it produced in Pharnabazus. The satraps whose 
lands Agesilaus had ravaged adopted Conon's proposal to 
send an agent into Greece with money in order to stir 
up trouble there and to open a second front in the 
war.23
Here, then, is another important link which joins the campaigns 
in Asia minor to events in mainland Greece.
Back in Greece, Lysander made a bid to regain some of his 
previous glory by invading Athens again, but this plan was 
defused by the action of Pausanias. Lysander also formulated a 
political plan which would have changed Spartan internal politics 
dramatically. He wanted to take the Spartan rulership away from 
the two lineages which then controlled it, and give it back to 
all the noble houses of Sparta.24 It is clear that this would 
have been a radical plan. After Lysander1s death, Agesilaus 
wanted to reveal the plan, in order to enhance his own reputation 
and to dispel the powerful influence of Lysander which still was 
a presence in Spartan politics. He was advised not to renew the 
memory of Lysander, advice which he wisely followed.25
Lysander was furious at being out of action. Sitting at home 
was not part of his plan to bring Sparta into a dominant position 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. He was ready to fight to regain 
his position within the city, and also to humble his rivals, 
Agesilaus and Pausanias. The Corinthian War represented perhaps 
the last chance for Lysander.
23 Hamilton, 1979, p. 187.
24 Plutarch'a LygflfldftC, 24-25.
25 Plutarch's Lygandtr, 30.3-4.
Agesilaus, on the other hand, did not look forward to a land 
war in Greece. Such a war could only force him to return from 
Asia in order to defend the city, something which he resisted 
doing. The domains of Asia Minor were critical to any mainland 
Greek power? "Without a firm base in the Aegean and in Asia Minor 
a Greek power could not maintain its position as hegemon in 
Greece itself.1*26 Agesilaus probably felt no further threat from 
Lysander, after Lysander was taken away from Asia Minor.
Agesilaus wanted to expand Spartan control to include the Greek 
cities of Asia Minor, and control of the Aegean. This ambition 
the Spartans shared, if nothing else.
Thebes, as the leader of a still-forming alliance, needed 
an incident to lure the Spartans into aggression. After signing 
their agreement with Athens, the alliance needed to establish 
momentum before it could be crushed by the Spartans. In short, 
the Thebans needed to provoke a Spartan response. Following this 
response, they needed to either defeat the Spartans, if only on a 
small scale. The pressure was on the Thebans to start the war but 
to start it off successfully.
Athenian motives at this point were perhaps the murkiest of 
all the involved parties. Just beginning to rebuild her military 
and economic power which were much the same thing for Athens, 
the city was at a vulnerable point. Seemingly the Athenians were 
taking a great risk in joining the alliance and casting their lot 
with the Thebans, a state with wnich they had no previous treaty
26 Perlman, 1964, p.8l.
obligations. However there were links between the two cities, for
tile aid which the Thebans had given to Athenian patriots:
The importance of the foreigners for the success of the 
democratic resistance to the Thirty is self-evident; no 
wonder that Thrasyboulus proposed giving citizenship to 
all who had helped.2'
In addition, this vulnerability may not have been too
important to the Athenians. In some way they may have had nothing
to lose from another war with Sparta. If they were defeated,
there was probably not much more that could be done to the city.
And living under a Spartan empire where Athens could not trade
freely would perhaps be more odious than to suffer another
defeat. Athenian hatred of Sparta was tireless:
At any rate it is worth noting that the immediate 
Athenian reaction to the resumption of hostilities 
against Sparta that we call the Corinthian War was the 
refortification of Peiraeus and the rebuilding of the 
Long Walls.27 8 29
Some authors28 suggest that Athens, alone out of the Greek 
cities, did not accept the money offered Ly Timocrates, the 
#iWfilian envoy. This seems unlikely at best. If any state in 
Greece needed monetary help to wage a war, it was definitely 
Athens.
If we now pause one final time before the summer of 395, we 
may examine the political and military situation to see what the 
Greeks may have expected would happen in the Corinthian War.
27 Krentz, 1980, p. 305. see also Harding, 1985, pp.8«io.
28 Harding, 1988, p. 64.
29 Freeman, 1950, p. 101.
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Sj^ Ffeefi military prowess was certainly unquestioned. There would 
^obafely be few observers then who would have suggested that a 
Spartan army could be defeated by an equal or even a greater 
force in the open field. Skeptics would probably also point to 
the fragile nature of the anti-Spartan alliance and predict that 
this alliance would not survive even an inconclusive military 
action. Only a miracle could keep the Spartans from walking away 
with a victory and a quick end to this uprising.
There are several accounts of *.he border incident which 
touched off the Corinthian War. Xenophon's Hellenics and the 
Hellenics Oxyrhynchia are the two best sources.29 Combining the 
various accounts, the following picture emerges.
For many years, there had been an ongoing dispute between 
V<-.: the Phoolan* and the Western Locrians over grazing land. At the
t & : : '• of Xsmenias and other anti-Spartan Thebans, the Locrians
sV j ' * ' ' ‘ * r
: we.re convinced to take the dispute a step further when the
& . . * ' '
|"?T7, . raiding season began again. Possibly reinforced by Theban
soldiers and certainly buoyed by the knowledge that the Thebans 
were committed to their cause, the Locrians raided Phocian 
territory, burning crops but taking no cities.
Just as Xsmenias expected, the Phocians appealed to the 
Spartans for help. Initially the Spartans responded with an 
arrogant letter ordering the Thebans to comply with Spartan 29
29 Xenophon, Hfillsnisfl, 3.5. also Hellenica Oxvrhvnchia 6- 
7(1-2), 16-18(11-13). See also Bruce, 1967, p. 119 and McKay, 
1953.
arbitration. This could have been because of Spartan ignorance 
Ct the true intentions of the Thebans. Alternately, it could have 
been a deliberate attempt by the Spartans to goad the Thebans 
into wari clearly an unnecessary measure. If this was the case# 
the message was likely sent by Lysander and his party, as 
Pausanias would never endorse such a move. He was not interested 
in another destructive war for Sparta.
In the end, the point is moot because the Thebans had no 
intention whatsoever of adhering to any Spartan decision. Their 
response consisted of further depredation of Phocian lands. This 
made it clear to the Spartans, certainly at the urging of 
Lysander, that a military response was in order. While Phocis was 
not of crucial importance from the Spartan point of view, the 
appeal of an ally did mean that spartan refutation was at stake. 
Furthermore, the Phocians were in i useful location, and their 
integration into a plan of battle would prove to be an 
advantage.30
The Spartan plan to defeat Thebes before the end of the 
summer was a clever one, though hampered by several logistical 
problems. The spartan forces were divided into two parts. One 
force, much the smaller, would be under the commend of Lysander. 
His men would swing north through Phocis and collect the allies 
there. Then they would proceed southward through the 
northwestern parts of Boiotia, arriving at Haliartos on a preset 
day. As this small core of Spartiates advanced, it would pick up
30 for more on this see McKay, 1953.
allies, both from Phocis and the rebellious states of northern 
\Bbietia* For example Orchomenos, the traditional rival of Thebes, 
Has always ready to break away from Theban control and the 
Beiotian confederacy.31 This movement would both secure the 
northern flank for the Spartans and deprive the Thebans of half 
of their own territory, the cities of the Boiotian confederacy.
At the same time, the army of the Peloponnesian League was 
to gather under the generalship of King Pausanias. This force 
would march north along the familiar road out of the Peloponnese, 
but instead of turning right to invade Attica, as it had so many 
times in the recent past, it would turn to the left and invade 
Boiotian territory instead.32 Traveling by road, this force would 
also arrive at Haliartos on the appointed day. These two forces 
Would then surely intimidate the defenders of Haliartos into
eurrendering. Haliartos would then serve as the perfect base
from which the Spartans and their allies could raid the rest of
Boiotia at will, in short, making life miserable for the
fltebans• The city was a natural fortress, in a perfect location;
Haliartos was important militarily as yet another 
strongpoint on the road from Northern to Southern 
Boiotia and unlike Koroneia could not be taken in flank 
by an army debouching from Helikon. It was excellently 
placed to command the last natural barrier into the 
plains of Southern Boiotia.33
This would probably bring the war to a swift and easy
31 Again, see Bruce, 1967, p
32 Hammond, 1954, p- 114.
33 Buckler, 1980, p* 5.
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conclusion, as the Thebans could not easily carry on without 
agricultural base and links to northwestern Boiotia.
The plan embodied a classic principle of military strategy: 
envelopment. Haliartos would be caught helpless in the pincers. 
However, the makers of plan (which we may safely assume included 
Lysander and perhaps Pausanias) neglected to consider two 
factors which later turned out to be of utmost importance. First, 
the plan depended upon secrecy. If the Thebans were to learn of 
Spartan plans, specifically the site and time of the rendezvous, 
they might be able to spring a trap of their own ~ which is 
precisely what happened at Haliartos. The Spartans should have 
realized that the movement of two separate armies in hostile 
territory is extremely difficult to conceal. This problem is 
compounded by the need for communication between the generals. 
Jiipii messenger sent by the Spartans was a chance taken that the 
;§illee would learn of the rendezvous. Indeed, the first and only
s '  -  ,  ,
'  * *  -■
;’Jtesaartger w« hear of is captured by Theban scouts, and brought
yiHtok to the city, where the plan is revealed.34
In this matter the accounts beg the question: why did the 
Spartans have to communicate at all? Because they had a date 
already agreed upon, it would seem that any confirmation would be 
unnecessary. What answer did Lysander expect? If things were 
proceeding according to plan, the reply could be dictated by 
Lysander himself. If something had gone wrong with the main 
Spartan force, Lysander was not likely to turn back anyway. This
34 Plutarch's Lysander. 28.2-3.
"SffiWtlon is indeed revealing of Lysander*s character. Because 
lUfSilider1 s main motivation for waging the Corinthian War was to 
fSftin some of his lost glory and influence, he did not really 
oars if Pausanias showed up at Haliartos or not. In fact, it 
would fit with Lysander*s plan if Pausanias did not make it to 
Haliartos. Although these are speculations, it meshes with what 
we know of Lysander1s character, and the events at Haliartos.
On the other hand, the plans of the allies were apparently 
very simple: to react to whatever Spartan action developed. This 
course seems the wisest, because every day that the alliance 
remained alive, the Spartan hegemony was weakened. It is true 
that the allies needed a victory in the first battle of the war, 
but they did not need to fight that battle at any particular 
tittSf and they certainly did not need to risk their forces in an 
excursion into the Peloponnese, So a wait-and-see attitude seems 
is have been the best course. Allied sc its were scattered all 
swerf the Boiotian landscapes, or at least along the major 
taw^ ibw^ a^ s^ * And the Thebans must have been in a state of military 
preparedness, owing to their speedy response to the Spartan 
attack. But we are left to wonder what would have happened if 
there had been no intercepted messenger. Perhaps the Spartans 
would have been able to overwhelm the Haliartian defenders, a 
case which seems likely, owing to the ease with which Lysander 
marched through northern Boiotia.
The Spartan plan went without a hitch in northern Boiotia. 
Plutarch's account says almost in passing that he took
Orchomenos,35 suggesting that little violence was involved This
seems more than likely, because Orchomenos was always hostile to
Theban interests. Picking up momentum and allies as he moved
along, Lysander next attacked and plundered Lebadeia. Although
this city did not come over to him freely, it also did not slow
him down. So it was with high morale and a large force that
Lysander crossed over Mt. Helikon and down onto Haliartos.
Instead of being an hindrance to the passage of his army, the
mountains were almost a help:
One sees why he was able to get so far into Boeotia 
without meeting opposition. With his army of 
highlanders having a rendezvous to keep with the main 
army from Sparta, he had simply come in over the 
mountain in what for the mountain peoples had already 
for ages been the usual way.36
Before making the final push, he sent the fateful messenger to 
Pausanias, advising him to be at Haliartos by the next morning* 
Meantime, Pausanias had assembled the forces of the 
Peloponnesian League and was marching to Plataea. 37 The 
Corinthians had decided not to send any soldiers on this 
expedition, which must have angered the Spartans greatly. 
Pausanias moved at a slow pace, but whether this was enough to 
throw him off schedule is unclear. He did not arrive on time, and 
he did not receive the message from Lysander. Never having 
received the message, he had continued the march at the same
35 Plutarch's Lysander. 28.1.
36 Burn, 1949, p. 320.
37 Plutarch's Lvsander. 28.2.
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pace.
As for the Thebans, they reacted to the Spartan plan as 
quickly as they could. The messenger must have been brought back 
to the Cadmea before a decision could be reached. When they 
obtained the details of the Spartan plan, the Thebans must have 
realized that to lose Haliartos would be the end of the infant 
alliance, and would have dire consequences for Thebes. They knew 
that a strong Spartan garrison at Haliartos could disrupt Theban 
harvest and commerce at will. It would be a crushing blow.
Unfortunately, their Athenian allies were not immediately 
ready to assist them. Without an army ready to go, the best the 
Thebans could do was to send men "as fast as they could", leaving 
the city of Thebes in the hands of a small Athenian force.38 What 
probably happened was that the Thebans sent every soldier they 
could muster to Haliartos. with such a short time to react, 
though, they only managed to get a few of their men inside the 
walls of Haliartos* The rest, possibly including the main 
phalanx, followed after, to arrive at the time of the battle 
itsel f *
Perhaps these soldiers were more diplomats and charismatic 
leaders sent (by horseback, possibly) to strengthen the resolve 
of the Haliartians. This could be done by reminding them of their 
federal obligations* The overnight appearance of soldiers from 
Thebes would indeed remind the Haliartians of the proximity of 
Thebes* The Spartans were indeed a near and present danger while
38 Plutarch'a Lvsander. 28.3.
her army was in the field, but a hostile Thebes endangered 
Haliartos all year long. The Athenians were to follow to 
Haliartos as quickly as they could, which would prove important 
on the second day of battle.
Lysander, having arrived outside Haliartos, was delighted 
to see that Pausanias had not arrived. This meant that he, 
assuming that he could take the city, would have the glory all 
for himself. And he had no reason to doubt that he could take the 
city, after his previous success. After waiting for much of the 
day, he decided to take action.
Lysander marched his army up to the city and went with a 
small entourage to speak with the Haliartians at the gate.39 
Exactly which gate this was is a subject of speculation by 
Austin, based on his excavations.40 In any case, this must be 
what Plutarch is speaking of when he describes the Spartan army 
divided into two parts, and is quite reckless of Lysander.
By splitting his army into two parts, he risked his own life 
unnecessarily, and left half of his army leaderless, to no gain 
whatsoever. Lysander was punished for his audacity by the 
Thebans. The main force attacked the Spartan in the rear, keeping 
the city on their left side.41 As the Spartans wheeled to face 
this new threat, the second part of the trap was sprung. The 
Haliartian defenders with their Theban allies charged out of the
39 Plutarch1 a Lysander. 28.5.
40 Austin, with more discussion here
41 Plutarch's Lysander, 28.4.
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city and attacked Lysander and his snr'X party, driving them back 
into the main body.42
Lysander himself was killed at this early stage of the 
action, reportedly by a Haliartian named Neochorus.43 After their 
leader was killed, and their forces thrown back upon one another, 
the Spartans and their allies took to the hills. The Thebans 
continued their pursuit eagerly, following them into the 
foothills of Helikon. There the Phocians turned the tables and 
killed many Theban hoplites. It is reported that the Thebans who 
were foremost in the pursuit were those who had been disgraced in 
battle against the Spartans earlier, and were reckless with their 
lives when the opportunity presented itself.44 In the end,
Spartan casualties are listed by Plutarch at about 1000, while 
the Thebans are said to have lost about 300 men.45 Lysander was 
dead, and his army dispersed, eliminated as a fighting force.
The news of Lysander*s defeat reached Pausanias as he and 
his army marched from Plataea to Thespiae.46 The army went into 
battle order and hurried to Haliartos. When they arrived later 
that day, one day after Lysander’s defeat, Pausanias was 
chagrined to find that Lysander*s army had completely dispersed. 
To make matters worse, the victorious Thebans stood arrayed
42 Plutarch*s Lysander. 28.5.
43 Plutarch*s Lvsander. 29.6.
44 Plutarch*s Lvsander. 28.6.
45 Plutarch's Lvsander. 28.6.
46 Plutarch's Lvsander. 29.1.
against him, with their Athenian allies by their sides. The 
Athenian force, under the command of Thrasybulus, was either in 
battle line with the Thebans, or lurking about in the background, 
waiting to take the Peloponnesian League army in the rear once 
battle was joined. In either case, Pausanias was faced with a 
superior force, which had just the previous day won a decisive 
battle.
Pausanias consulted with the other Spartan commanders to 
determine a course of action. Spartan pride, in the body of 
Lysander lay murdered and unburied just outside the walls of the 
city. To fight a battle in the effort to get that body back would 
be a risky affair. The Spartans would be at the mercy of 
projectiles launched from the city, and could be attacked both by 
defenders sallying forth from the city, and also the forces 
outside the city.
The most favorable result which could be achieved from such 
a battle would be the successful retrieval of Lysander*s body.
The worst result, which was far more likely, was the annihilation 
of a second Spartan force, and the death of another Spartan 
general and a king. On the other hand, to negotiate with the 
Thebans for the bodies would be tantamount to an admission of 
defeat. The Spartans would leave the battlefield under the terms 
of the Thebans, their upstart former allies. The very thought of 
this infuriated many old line Spartans. They thought that the 
only thing for the Spartans to do was to fight to the death in 
order to recover the body of the fallen Lysander. They would
rather die in hopeless battle than leave under a white flag,
Pausanias must have considered all of these arguments, but 
the decision was entirely up to him. As the Spartan King, his 
decision was final in the field. He decided to negotiate for the 
bodies of Lysander and his men.47 In return for the bodies, the 
Thebans demanded that the Spartans leave Boiotia peacefully. 
Pausanias took this offer, retrieved the bodies, and headed 
north. Lysander was buried on friendly Phocian soil as soon as it 
was reached, and the army of the Peloponnesian League returned 
home.
The effect of the battle on the Spartans and their empire 
was immediate. The debacle at Haliartos, while it was no means
the end of Sparta, showed that Spartan arms could be defeated in 
the field. The spell of Spartan invulnerability was broken. The 
Spartans would go on to win many more battles, and even bring the 
Corinthian War to a successful conclusion, but the dream of
world empire was over.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Lysander*s
dream of Spartan empire was over. With his death, Sparta was left 
without the dynamic leader who could have solidified their hold 
over the Eastern Mediterranean. Although it was in part the 
tyranny of Lysander's authoritarian rule which had so incensed 
the Greek states, relentless brutality would probably have had 
better effect than half-hearted oppression. Revolutions occur 
when the oppressed are given a taste of freedom, but are not
Plutarch's Iffsaffdey. 29.2-3.
allowed any more. This is the case with the Spartan empire and 
its Greek subjects.
After the fall of Athens, Thebes and other city states got 
their first real taste of political freedom in many years. When 
the Spartans threatened to take this away from them, the cities 
reacted violently. If Sparta had not exhausted herself in the 
Peloponnesian War, she might have had the economic and military 
power to dominate Greek politics. But Sparta in 395 was not 
capable of solving these problems by using brute force.
In this sense, the policies of Agesilaus and Pausanias seem 
more realistic than those of Lysander. By fighting more of a 
delaying action against the enemies of the city, perhaps these 
two kept the fall of Sparta off for decades. But the Spartans had 
never been the kind of warriors who waited for the fight to come 
to them. This point of view is represented not only by Lysander, 
but also by the old guard of commanders who wanted to fight for 
his body. Whether they agreed with his policies or not, their 
pride as Spartans commanded them to fight to the death to recover 
the bodies of their fallen comrades.
The fact that a Spartan King would retreat in the face of a 
force made up of Thebans and Athenians who had just recently been 
defeated, was unthinkable by traditional Spartan standards* So we 
can see that by 395 B.C., Spartan standards had changed 
somewhat. The degree to which they remained the same determined 
the fate of Pausanias as he returned from battle.
Hie people of Sparta were outraged that their King would
surrender to the Thebans and Athenians, The survivors of the 
battle were a disgrace to their relatives. Spartan parents would 
much rather have a dead son than a son who returned from such a 
humiliation. Pausanias was banished to Tegea, where he stayed to 
the end of his days, writing of his political life and attacking 
his opponents with the pen rather than the sword.48
As for Lysander, at the same time that this battle took his 
life and ended his dreams of Spartan ascendancy, it rendered him 
an impressive hero in Spartan culture. After his death, when it 
was revealed that he had kept none of the war booty from the 
Peloponnesian War, admiration for him g* ew. The suitors of his 
daughters suddenly withdrew their petitions after finding their 
potential father in law to be a pauper, but they were punished 
for their greed.49 Lysander, the first Spartan to be worshiped as 
a god, was similarly admired after his death. Several locales 
claim the tomb of Lysander as their own, the most likely location 
being on the road from Chaironeia to Delphi.50 Lysander, owing to 
the actions of Pausanias, is perhaps more fondly remembered than 
he ought to be. After all, he threw his life away for a chance at 
recapturing some of his faded glory. His failure led directly to 
Pausanias9 forced negotiations with the Thebans, and to the 
recall of Agesilaus from Asia. The battle of Haiiartos was the 
crowning blunder of Lysander*s military career.
48 Plutarch's Lysander, 30.1.
49 Plutarch's Lyaanflax, 30.5.
9 0  Austin, 1932, p. 209.
Following the battle there was no choice for Agesilaus* The 
dwindling numbers of Spartan men, combined with the shifting 
political picture in Greece meant that the city itself could be 
in danger if Agesilaus and his army did not somehow occupy some 
of the forces of the alliance. Agesilaus began the journey home 
by land, because water travel was not safe. Following the defeat 
of the Spartan navy at the hand of Conon the Athenian, the only 
safe way to return to Greece was by land, a route which would 
take much longer and would mean that Agesilaus1 army would arrive 
from the north. Eventually, Agesilaus would fight several battles 
as he made his way back to the Peloponnese, and the war would 
drag on for several more years, to be ended by the King’s Peace 
in 387 B.C..
The effect of the battle on the allies was tremendous. It 
secured Corinth and Argos as allies, in addition to ueveral other 
smaller states. Corinth was the most important of these because 
her position allowed the allies to keep the Spartans hemmed in 
within the Peloponnese, so that warfare would not take place on 
the green fields of either Attica or Boiotia. Corinth and Argos, 
now newly allied, were willing to take the risk of war with
Sparta because they saw the possibility that Spartans could be 
defeated on the battlefield.
The defeat of the Spartans at Haliartos lent great 
credibility and prestige to the Theban phalanx. Because it was 
considered impossible to defeat the Spartan army in an open 
battle, this served to heighten the reputation of Thebes as a
ISiip
military power. Agesilaus would prove that, with good 
generalship, the Spartan phalanx was still the finest army in 
Greece, but the damage had already been done. No longer was 
Sparta an irresistible force. The Thebans even after the Kingfs 
Peace did not forget this, and they carried it with them when 
they were led into battle by Epaminondas and Pelopidas. The 
battle of Haliartos is one of the early links in the chain of 
events that leads to the new Theban army.51
If the battle of Haliartos was a victory for Theban arms, it 
was also a victory for Persian diplomacy. Even though the mission 
of Timocrates did not decide the course of events in the 
Corinthian War, it may have been the catalyst which set those 
events in motion. From the investment of fifty talents which 
Timocrates brought with him, the Persian satraps reaped a hefty 
dividend.
The Spartan expedition in Asia minor and Ionian Greece had 
to be cut short. The expedition of Agesilaus no longer troubled 
the empire, or sapped any of her resources. And at the same time, 
the political situation in Greece remained cloudy, with no strong 
dynamic state at the top. This sort of political situation is 
always to the advantage of neighboring states, in the sense that 
a region in turmoil is not normally capable of aggression. Greece 
would probably have been as easy a target at this time for the 
Persians, but another invasion of the Greek mainland was clearly 
not a wise policy for the Persians.
Wote from article about military evolution
The political situation in Greece at this time was ewtINSill# 
fluid. Thebes1 alliance with Athens in 395 after lobbying heavily 
for the complete destruction of that city in 404 shows a 
machiavellian slant in foreign relations. In such an environment, 
it would be difficult to trust anyone. Even the cities of the 
Boiotian Confederation deserted Thebes quickly in the hour of 
need. This kind of atmosphere was what the Persians were trying 
to create. With the Corinthian War, they got what they wanted. 
When the war was settled, the peace was ensured by a decree from 
the Persian King, to which both sides agreed. The fact that a 
Persian King could dictate terms of peace to Greece, in whatever 
form, shows the weakness of the Greeks.
The only way to understand the actions of the Spartans and 
their leaders in this episode is to use Plutarch's biographical 
knowledge. This picture is by no means entirely reliable, but 
when properly analysed, it clarifies the otherwise mysterious 
actions of the Spartan leaders.
Lysander represented the Sparta that fought at Thermopylae, 
the Sparta that had men for its walls. The new Spartan leaders, 
Agesilaus and Pausanias, had a newer vision of Sparta. They 
wanted to take the conquests of Lysander and administrate them in 
a new way, which meant that foreign policy had to be more 
flexible. This is not to say that Lysander had no ambition, on 
the contrary, his ambition is clearly outlined at several points 
in the account of Plutarch. But the ambition of Agesilaus was to
be the administrator of a Spartan empire, not necessarily a 
military hero.
Agesilaus was capable of quiet diplomacy. Plutarch says that
he often won his political opponents over to his side by being so
considerate of their wishes and bribing them:
If ever the ephors visited him when he was seated in 
his royal chair and administering justice, he rose in 
their honor; and as men were from time to time made 
members of the senate, he would send each one a cloak 
and an ox as a mark of honor.52
Lysander was not one to waste money on bribes, or waste his
breath complimenting people. While Agesilaus charmed the
Persians, Lysander angered the Greeks. For example, when
Agesilaus uncovered Lysander*s plan to change the political order
to include more of the lower classes after Lysander*s death, he
wisely did not bring this up and raise the ghost of Lysander.
Lysander, had their positions somehow been reversed, would not
have thought twice about publishing such an account, without
regard for the consequences or appearances.
The conflict between Agesilaus and Lysander was a political
and a personal battle, with Sparta as the prize. When such a
contest is occurring just as the state has won a great victory, 
it shows that the victory itself was hollow. Sparta was not 
really in control following their defeat of Athens in the 
Peloponnesian War. If Sparta could not even agree on the wisest 
course after the war, then they were clearly not destined for the 
kind of domination previously shown by the Athenians.
52 Plutarch's Aoaailaus, 4 . 3*4 . sae also Gray, 1 9 8 1 .
Agesilaus won the battle of personalities with the death of 
Lysander. He went on to guide the Spartans through some of their 
bleakest times until his death. If Lysander had won, the course 
of events would not likely have been substantially different. The 
Corinthian War might have ended earlier, but Sparta would 
constantly be fighting against the other cities in Greece, and in 
the end, Sparta would have ended up in the same predicament.
One view of the battle of Haliartos is presented by C.D. 
Hamilton:
Shortly after the alliance Lysander moved to 
Haliartus, his destined rendezvous with King Pausanias.
It is not possible to tell whether Lysander acted 
precipitately at Haliartus by attacking the city before 
the time appointed to join forces with Pausanias or 
whether the latter in fact delayed his arrival beyond 
the agreed time.53
Certainly it is true that the sources here do not entirely clear 
up the situation, but they do state some facts which are highly 
suggestive. To put it simply, unless they forgot how to tell 
time, either Lysander arrived early, Pausanias delayed, or both. 
Hamilton qualifies his earlier statement in the following way:
In any event, a battle ensued close to the walls of 
Haliartus in which Lysander was killed and his troops 
defeated. It is very likely that King Pausanias 
delayed out of reluctance to bring on a war that was 
contrary to his entire career; or Lysander may have 
rushed into battle from fear of Pausanias* intentions, 
since he had been tricked once before by the king at 
Athens in 403*54
As Hamilton says, it is either one or the other, and it may
53 Hamilton, 1979, p.206. see also Xenophon's Hellenlca 
3.5.18-19, 25. and Plutarch’s Lysander 28.2-3.
54 Haul1ton, 1979, p. 206.
possibly be both* The personal conflict between the Spartan 
leaders is in any event ultimately responsible.
The fourth century, besides being a time of great political 
and social change in Greece, was also a period of revolution in 
military institutions: "Between the end of the Peloponnesian War 
in 404 and the accession of Alexander the Great in 336 a military 
revolution in the Greek world changed the nature of ancient 
warfare....1,55 The battle of Haliartos, while it is no great 
watershed in military history, is nevertheless part of this 
revolution. The battles of classical Greece had always been 
fought between masses of heavily armed hoplites, arranged closely 
into phalanxes. But by the end of the fourth century, Alexander 
the Great changed the style of warfare completely by successfully 
integrating other elements, such as cavalry, peltasts and 
auxiliaries into his army. Light infantry was particularly 
important: M...it was not clear that Spartan hoplites, on more 
favorable terrain and in a situation more nearly tactically 
equal, could be defeated by light troops. During the Corinthian 
War Iphicrates showed conclusively that the hoplite was 
vulnerable to attack by light infantry.1156 Siege warfare also 
became an important part of campaigning, as armies learned how to 
storm cities, and defenders were forced to devise ways to foil 
the assaults. 56
55 P«rriU, 1985, p. 149.
56 Ferrill, 1985, p. 157.
The battle of Haliartos clearly falls into the first 
division of Military science. The conflict is basically one 
between the spartan phalanx and the Theban hoplites. In the first 
day of battle, the Thebans caught the Spartan force, which was 
primarily composed of allies, on the flank and routed it. The 
second day of battle saw the army of the Peloponnesian league 
faced down by the combined Theban and Athenian forces. In 
addition, taking Haliartos by siege is never an option for the 
Spartans. Essentially, this is a triumph of the Theban soldier 
over the Spartan, but there are some important details.
The deployment of Lysander's force with great dispatch 
through the mountainous terrain and onto Haliartos speaks of a 
new speed and flexibility. By taking advantage of the native 
of tlii terrain, the^fpnriacik. Client ■ 
their troops, which could easily traverse the mountains. The 
allies* troops, which wore certainly more loosely organized than 
the Spartans, were perhaps similar soldiers to the paltests which 
would be later employed. They showed their ability In the open 
field when they turned on their pursuers and killed a substantial 
number. I do not naan to imply that these soldiers are peltests, 
but they to share the ability to operate in a fluid battlefiele 
situation, which is the trademark of the lightly armed troops and 
the bane of the phalanx.
The battle of Haliartos amt A*# ©onte*tpose spny difficult
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be resolved by referring to the historical sources, but certainly 
not all are so easily solved. No one could argue that the 
documents are entirely reliable, and that conclusions drawn from 
then are ironclad. Nor is it fair to say that answers supplied by 
archaeology are foolproof. But archaeology, and especially 
anthropological archaeology, do hav<- important roles to fill in 
historical research. The interaction between these two
disciplines is vital to the health and continued growth of both 
of then. To illustrate this point, Haliartos can serve as a test 
case for the possible future interaction of historians and 
archaeologists.
The first set of guestions answerable by archaeology are 
fairly basic ones. Where is Haliartos? Where did the battle take 
place exactly? Which gate did the Haliartians charge out of when 
they took Lysander by surprise? These are all guestions which can 
he answered (and for the most part, have been answered) by 
applying the trowel to the ground in search of data. For many 
years, this has been the role of archaeology in Classical | 
Studies. The excavations of Austin out of the British 
Athens57 are just this sort of work as applied to Haliartos. 
Working during three seasons in the field, Austin excavated the 
acropolis at Haliartos, and also surveyed the rest of the city.rv '
The 1920*8 and 1930's, were a tine when archaeologists were
prinarily ooneemed with recovering data and classifying it with 
Ih. oyf towards reconstructing culture history. This sesnt that
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they were trying to sketch an outline of history where before 
there was none. By dating pottery styles, applying rules of 
stratigraphy and so on, they chronicled the changes in the 
cultures whose material remainsthey uncovered. In the case of 
ancient Greece, where so much was already known about history, 
the analysis could become that much more precise, as styles of 
pottery, architecture and so on could be dated with much 
precision. In sum, this research was jlassificatory and 
descriptive, which is part of the classical archaeology both of
the thirties and of today.
In addition, the archaeological surveys which are today 
being carried out in Boiotia and other regions of Greece also try 
to meet more anthropological goals. This sort of archaeology is 
concerned with culture history, but also the processes by which 
cultures change and more of the details of day to day existence. 
While Austin's report had an appendix on the historical context 
of his work at Haliartos, the twentieth century surveys have more 
detailed information on plant biology and environmental 
studies.58 Austin saw Haliartos as part of a systam of political 
alliances and diplomacy, whereas Snodgrass seats to see it more 
as a part of an ecological system.
Both kinds of archaeology utilize excavation, the stock and 
trade of the discipline. Without the recovery of material from 
the ground, material analysis of the site is impossible. It is
probable that the excavations of the 1930's had less detail
I . M e  i i i w m m i H m t fm






archaeological techniques have advanced greatly in the 
intervening years, Today researchers are able to squeeze more 
information out of the dirt than ever before. This must always be 
a concern because once a site has been excavated, it can never be 
excavated again. But there are archaeological techniques which 
are not destructive.
Survey is a part of archaeology which is becoming more and 
more important as the discipline evolves, in fact, it may 
eventually become more important than excavation, as the forces 
of our expanding society infringe on more and more sites. In the 
case of Central Greece, the archaeological surveys there have 
allowed an overview of the region to be made, without an effort 
to find all the sites in an area, regional comparisons are hard 
to make. Detailed investigation of individual sites is still 
needed to put some flesh on the skeleton, but the greater scope 
of archaeological surveys makes them very valuable.
In Boiotia, there have been several expeditions, M e t  
notably the Cambridge/Bradford Boiotian expedition.59 The project 
is essentially a detailed examination of much of rural Boiotia, 
from the early Bronze Age up through the Modern period. While at 
the time of the most recent publication the territory of 
Haliartos was just barely infringed upon, the authors promise 
that upcoming seasons will include more of this aroa. Using the 
survey, it may be possible to chronicle the fluctuations in
population in this area, perhaps gaining insight into which
e n . n l       ri.ui. ji in hi n
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cities were stronger at which tines, while this may sinply 
reflect knowledge obvious from the written sources, it would also 
tell us many details which the written sources do not.
A more detailed picture of the economic and political 
relations of a city like Haliartos to the agricultural hinterland 
could be achieved in this way* Even if the data supported the 
written accounts, this would then be a tremendous demonstration 
of the reliability of historical sources and methods. In other 
cases, it could help correct misunderstandings created by 
ambiguous sources. And it may help fill in area entirely 
neglected by the ancient authors.
Anthropological archaeology is different from the 
archaeology of J.P Austin and the early twentieth century in many 
ways. There is less concern with examining objects as treasures 
in and of themselves. The most valuable thing to be gained from 
excavation is the data which it furnishes about the extinct 
society. Individual artifacts are of course still indispensable, 
but the context in which they are found is equally important. A 
beautiful Greek vase is just a pot if we don't know where it came 
from. This strong statement must be true for archaeologists 
because the context can reveal so many things about the vase, 
and the people who made it.
Additionally, archaeologists today are freed from many of 
the old concerns about classification and chronology from the 
experience of their forbears. Thanks to the hard work of 
geperetiona of scholars, reliable chronologies of pottery,
stratigraphy and so on have been established in many places 
around the world that were previously unknown. The advent of 
laboratory dating techniques such as carbon-14 and 
thermoluminescencehave freed up archaeologists to pursue more 
interesting questions. At the sane time that this allows 
archaeologists to be of more immediate help to the historian, it 
also frees up the archaeologist to investigate historical periods 
with the same attention to detail which has always characterized 
the discipline. Historical periods, while not traditionally the 
province of the anthropological archaeologist, can be fruitfully 
investigated by such techniques.
But if such investigations are to be successful, a new 
alliance will have to formed between anthropology and history.
Not all scholars will immediately see the utility of such a 
union, but as valuable research accumulates, its value will 
become undeniable. Historians are not trained in the analysis of 
culture through material remains, and archaeologists are not 
trained in the study of history through written records. Bach 
kind of data points to questions resolvable by analysis of the 
other, but it takes intelligent and versatile scholars on both 
sides of the fence to make a cooperative arrangement work.
The discipline of history remains as vital and important in 
1990 as it was in the time of Plutarch. To sustain this
relevance, I believe that history must continue to work closely 
with other diaciplines, especially anthropological archaeology.
bottle pf Kaliartoa stands not only at a turning point in
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Greek history, but also represents one of nany opportunities to 
coabine historical and archaeological research. Both disciplines 
are strengthened by such cooperation.
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